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Introduction
The role of joint ventures (JVs) in the history of multinational enterprises (MNEs)
remains controversial. According to international business studies, MNEs prefer JVs as a
way to expand into new markets at lower risk than when using the wholly owned mode of
entry. Local JV partners can also gain new technology and thus increase competitiveness
(Hall, 1984; Beamish, 1988; United Nations, 1990). In general, when the market is
monopolistic, MNEs with a significant advantage (e.g., brand power) can achieve market
expansion using the wholly owned mode of entry. When the market is more competitive,
MNEs use JVs to reduce risks; they become minority shareholders to learn about the market
(Kuroda, 2011). Empirical studies done on developing countries have discussed JVs’
positive impacts on recipients’ learning capabilities. For example, Santikarn (1981)
evaluated how JVs in the Thai textile industry enable local partners to improve their
technological knowledge. In addition, Simyar and Argheyd (1987) considered JVs the most
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appropriate method of entry into the Chinese market in the 1970s and 1980s because of
their entry and exit flexibility and potential assistance in transferring technology.
However, various problems can prompt partners to dissolve JVs. These problems occur
because of differences in expectations, motivations, attitudes toward competition, and
management styles. Charles. P. Kindleberger presented a skeptical view of JVs as a successful
form of business partnership and pointed out that it is rare for both partners to maintain
common interests over the long term (Teichova et al., 1989). Studies on Japanese-American
and Japanese-European JVs argue that Japanese MNEs use JVs as a “Trojan Horse” with
which to enter the local partner’s technological arena (Hennart et al., 1999) while,
contrastingly, presenting empirical data on the continuity of Japanese-American and Japanese
-European JVs (Ishii, 2009).
Studies on inward FDI (foreign direct investment) to Japan in the interwar period suggest
that transferring technology was not an automatic process, as was assumed by many
theorists (Kudo, 1998; Yuzawa and Udagawa, 1990). Joint ventures are dynamic because
both partners contribute to the new venture by, for example, providing resources and
selecting their allocation (Franko, 1971). In other words, if one partner continues to
contribute the same input while the other upgrades its own, the end result could be the
dissolution of the JV (Hennart et al., 1999). To ensure that the JV survives and remains
competitive, the technology owner should proactively transfer technology, and the receiver
should willingly learn and contribute as an equally capable partner. In addition, MNEs seem
to use JVs as a short-term way to enter new markets where they lack the necessary skills to
access and meaningfully interpret local market knowledge. Once they gain a thorough
understanding of the market, they may choose to leave their partners or buy out the
partners’ shares and become wholly owned. Thus, local partners may regard MNEs as
opportunistic. On the other hand, MNEs might perceive local partners as being slow to
upgrade their production and management knowledge. Amid pressure to compete in a new
environment, JVs also need to resolve problems associated with their weakest link to keep
up with rivals. Unlike the wholly owned mode of entry, whereby MNEs have complete
control over affiliated companies overseas, the JV mode of entry requires MNEs to negotiate
and compromise with local partners about how to further their marketing and organizational
strategies. However, this increases pressure on management, which can manifest in
conflicting views on coordination and competition within and outside the venture.
Consequently, the JVs that are able to survive their cultural and managerial problems and
upgrade their organizational capabilities seem to be the exception.
To overcome such difficulties and ensure a successful JV for all parties concerned,
partners must possess complementary capabilities the others lack, or at least, show that they
can catch up with the other’s capabilities in a timely manner. However, the literature neither
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traces the key pre- and post-JV processes nor investigates the reactions of JV parties to the
changing and challenging environment they face. The literature also assumes that the
“success” of a JV lies in the calculative perspective both partners may have before their
investment. Prior studies focus more on ex ante decision making and less on the ex post
decision-making process. A JV can bring tremendous benefits but needs to be conducted
under a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. These determine whether the concerned
parties will generate the best results for all venture members. This study seeks to identify
the mechanism that drives JV success by investigating this process in detail.
Joint Ventures in Thailand since the 1950s
As Suehiro (2008) and Suehiro and Wailerdsak (2014) explain, the Thai economy has
developed through “cooperation and competition” with local business groups and multinationals.
The 1950s marked a crucial period for both Thailand and Japan. While the Japanese
domestic market began experiencing saturation and needed to expand overseas, Thailand
decided to implement its import substitute policy. The Thai government encouraged domestic
production as an import-substitute measure, whereas the Japanese government encouraged
international trade in Japanese products. As a shortcut with which to overcome the country’s
status as a technological laggard, the Thai government established an FDI-promotion scheme
and promoted it to overseas investors, including in Japan (Terumitsu Okawa, 2014, personal
communication). At the time, Thailand had insufficient capabilities with which to
independently build the technology it needed quickly enough to compete with other
countries in an era of free trade (Kuroda, 2011). Moreover, solely relying on the export of
commodities such as rice, teak, and tin was not enough to support economic development.
The Japanese government promoted outward FDI while Thailand’s Sarit administration
welcomed FDI as a means to promote industrialization because the manufacturing and
marketing infrastructures were either scarce or non-existent. Western counterparts tended to
choose wholly owned companies as the entry mode into the Thai market, while most
Japanese enterprises tended to use JVs (Suehiro, 1989). The former allows for stronger
control over the new venture, while the latter is less risky because MNEs can leapfrog the
difficult process of learning about the local market. However, the challenge of maintaining
and upgrading the partners’ ability to keep a JV competitive has received scant interest from
scholars. Moreover, studies about Japanese-Thai JVs are limited to examinations of light and
semi-heavy industries such as the textile and automobile sectors, where high initial
investment is a barrier for local partners wishing to engage in manufacturing.1
1 Yamashita (1991) presents several case studies on technical corporations and JVs in Thailand. In a
recent study, Kawabe (2011) described the history of Thai Toyota and the Thai automobile industry,
one of the most successful examples of Thailand’s rapid industrialization.
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Japanese-Thai JVs in the Thai Toiletry and Cosmetic Industries
Amid the flow of technology-oriented industry investments into the Thai market, a less
complex, technology-oriented but more consumer-oriented industry is worth investigating:
the toiletry industry. The Thai toiletry industry is a greenfield market with high-potential
consumers awaiting new product introductions. Its history dates back to 1908, when
Unilever (known as “Lever Brothers” prior to 1997) began producing and selling soap in
Thailand at the request of Rama V, King of Siam (as Thailand was called before 1949).
Unilever established its first large-scale plant in 1932 and produced Lux and Sunlight. The
first shampoo was introduced in the 1950s by Berli Jucker, a large European trading
company in Thailand. Colgate Palmolive was set up in 1958 and introduced synthetic
detergents via its Fab brand. Japanese companies Kao and Lion, the objects of this study,
began exporting soap and shampoo to Thailand in the mid-1950s and started JVs in the mid
-1960s (Lion Dentifrice, 1973). After a brief experience in the country, Procter & Gamble re
-entered Thailand in 1988. In addition to the aforementioned foreign corporations, local
trading company Saha Pathanapibul (hereafter “Sahapat”), a core company of the Saha
Group, actively represented Japanese products as a key partner to both Lion and Shiseido.
The Saha group dealt in a wide range of consumer products and was the most influential
domestic group in the distribution, advertisement, and production of toiletries (Suehiro and
Nanbara, 1991, pp. 150-153; Thanawat, 2001, pp. 120-129). Small and medium-sized
domestic enterprises in the cosmetics industry also began experiencing growth. However,
although new local enterprises were multiplying, Unilever retained its position as the market
leader in Thai toiletries and cosmetics, occupying more than 40 percent of the detergent
market. Colgate, Kao, and Lion represented the primary competition. In addition, Johnson
and Johnson, Avon, Shiseido, and Unicharm entered the Thai market in the 1960s and 1970s
and have maintained their strength in specific market segments.
This industry is tremendously competitive, with first movers who possess strong brand
power. The industry also illustrates the extent of the local adaptation of consumer products
and of the complex competitive environment among the four big players in the industry;
two of the first movers are from England and the United States, and two of the second
movers are from Japan. Toiletry and cosmetics comprise minor industries in Thailand;
however, they have developed through the expansion of the Thai consumer market along
with the rapid industrialization of Thailand. In 2012, the Thai beauty and personal care
market grew to an estimated USD 4,500 million,2 becoming the largest market in Southeast
Asia. The value of beauty and cosmetics exports from Thailand increased 20-fold between
2 Data from Euromonitor, Passport (2013).
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1996 and 2012,3 and exports to Japan now represent 25 percent of the total exports of Thai
cosmetics. This achievement is the result of competition and cooperation among these
multinational companies, their rivals, and their local partners. Unlike heavy industries, this
consumer product market largely depends on knowing consumer preferences; thus, a capable
local partner is crucial to success.
Thai Kao and Thai Lion were selected as case studies because they entered the Thai
market at approximately the same time and used a similar route of local connections, but
ended up at different positions. The Thai Kao JV was dissolved after 30 years, while Thai
Lion continues to exist and has celebrated its 40th anniversary. As latecomers, and in
contrast to Unilever and Colgate in Thailand, these two companies competed effectively
with well-established brands and achieved significant growth. This reveals that the two
companies must have upgraded their capabilities to match those of the first movers, which
were strong in terms of both tangible and intangible capital in the market. Interestingly, both
companies were passive about entering Thailand but decided to do so when strongly
persuaded by their local partners, who were their sales agents for years before the JVs were
established. Thus, the local partners knew more than the Japanese partners, and the Japanese
had to rely on local partners for expertise in the Thai market.
Because consumer products tend to be consumer-oriented, marketing is central to the
development of these industries. Distribution channel is a crucial marketing element for
Japanese companies, given the economic history of industrialization and modernization in
Japan. Kao and Lion developed different models for connecting to the market. As the largest
Japanese company in toiletries and the second largest in the cosmetics industry, Kao is an
excellent object of analysis with which to gain an understanding of Japan’s unique
distribution system (known as ryutsu keiretsu, a type of semi-vertical integration led by
manufacturers, including sales companies and retail groups). Kao is an excellent choice
mainly because of its strong sales company, which serves as a wholesaler but deals solely
with Kao products. Lion has a more open channel that uses independent wholesalers, but it
organized its retailers as a retail group, named “Lion Ten Kai,” an approach that is also
typical of Japanese distribution (Sasaki, 2007).
As Kao is larger and is better known internationally, it has been closely studied by
Western scholars, especially by Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002), who conduct a comparative
study of international management and of the merits of the centralized organization Kao
used in the 1980s. However, organizational changes before and after this period were not
adequately examined. In addition, although there is a reliable empirical study on the global
3 Ministry of Commerce Thailand, Foreign Trade Statistics of Thailand.
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business history of cosmetics and toiletries, investigation of the Thai market is limited
(Jones, 2010). Nonetheless, Japanese scholars have produced numerous studies on the Thai
market in the early industrialization period. Suehiro and Nanbara (1991, pp. 141-166)
described the history of Sahapat, a manufacturer of general consumer goods, and studied its
local managers and JVs with various Japanese enterprises. Endo (2013) conducted detailed
surveys on the distribution channels of Unilever Thailand and Sahapat in his wide-ranging
work on the modernization of Thai distribution. Ihara (2009, 2014) wrote one of the few
studies on the marketing of Japanese enterprises in Thailand. He noted that Japanese
companies have influenced Thai product development and distribution through marketing
activities that emphasize high product quality and effective adaptation to the Thai market.
Although all of these studies are useful, their references to the Thai cosmetic and toiletry
industry are limited. This study aims to present a broader and more detailed perspective on
how the industry players interact and how they cooperated to develop the industry into its
current form.
The following section describes how Kao and Lion led different types of JVs: Kao was
headquarters-oriented, while Lion was locally oriented. In other words, there was a contrast
between centralized and decentralized relationships with headquarters and the local venture.
The section also examines how these corporations introduced Japanese technology and
management experiences, focusing on how they introduced the Japanese approach to
marketing and adapted it to the Thai context. It also considers several case studies to
examine whether the leading factor for each corporation was capability development or a
change in relationship. The study thus focuses on the change in relationship with
headquarters, such as a change in capital share, responsibility, and authority. Kao started the
JV as a majority-owned enterprise and changed to a wholly owned structure in 1998, while
Lion and Sahapat started as a mutually cooperative enterprise with a 50:50 capital share,
then changed the capital ratio to 49:51 in 1974 and to 51:49 in 1997.4 Thus, the study
covers the relevant events from the 1950s to the late 1990s. As shown in Table 1, the
economic performance levels of Kao and Lion do not differ significantly, except that Lion
had greater sales before the 1980s while Kao had larger sales after the 1990s and had
maintained high profitability at the beginning of the 2000s.5
4 The registered capital share was revised to 49:51 to make the company Thai-owned in 1974, after a
student protest against Japanese companies and products. It changed to 51:49 after the 1997 financial
crisis to make it a Japanese company so that the venture could be supported by the Japanese
government (Boonyarith Mahamontri, 2014, personal communication).
5 Kao and Lion perform at a lower level than Unilever in terms of both scale and profitability; thus, it is
difficult to compare the performance levels of these companies with Unilever’s in terms of sales
because the latter has a broader range of businesses, encompassing not only toiletries but also food and
fat oil. However, this is the only key indicator we could use to consider performance.
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Case of Kao-Taishin
Establishment of Kao Thailand
The Kao Corporation was established in 1887 in Japan as an importer of soaps,
cosmetics, and other daily-use products. With the management philosophy that “a clean
nation prospers,” Kao developed as a soap manufacturer and, after the 1950s, attained the
foremost market position in detergents through the aggressive introduction of Western
management skills and technology. Kao’s expansion beyond Japan began in the early 1930s
in a few East Asian regions. Kao began exporting Feather shampoo to Thailand, Singapore,
and Hong Kong in 1957, establishing strong reputations in each of these regions. Kao
expanded its activities to Europe and North America in the 1980s. It also established
Shanghai Kao, its first Chinese subsidiary, in 1994. Kao’s international organization has
extensive experience of change. The description in Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002, pp. 8-12) of
Kao as a centralized organization in the 1980s is correct. From the 1950s to 1970s,
subsidiaries were given autonomy and eventually became “mini Kaos” that imitated the
marketing and production styles of headquarters. Kao strengthened its centralization in the
1980s, when it arranged its first formal organization for overseas business. Kao then
strengthened this centralization considerably in the late 1990s, when each subsidiary was
required to meet profit guidelines and to submit periodical financial reports to headquarters.
The subsidiaries had no right to modify local products under the same brand.
Kao began exporting its Feather shampoo powder to Thailand in 1957, after the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Thailand. In 1951, Suvit
Praisankul, the owner of Kao’s export agency, established the Taishin Industrial Co. Ltd,
Table 1. Financial Performance of Major Toiletry Companies in Thailand
(Million Baht)
Year
Lever Brother (Thailand) Colgate-Palmolive(Thailand)
Lion Corporation
(Thailand)
Kao Industrial
(Thailand)
Procter & Gamble
Manufacturi (Thailand)
Net
Sales
Net
Profit
Profita
bility
Net
Sales
Net
Profit
Profita
bility
Net
Sales
Net
Profit
Profita
bility
Net
Sales
Net
Profit
Profita
bility
Net
Sales
Net
Profit
Profita
bility
1980 1,614 78 4.8% 1,012 46 4.6% 573 2 0.4% 226
1985 2,412 311 12.9% 1,444 -33 -2.3% 923 9 1.0% 540 24 4.4%
1990 3,441 144 4.2% 2,323 23 1.0% 1,443 69 4.8% 1,792 99 5.5%
1995 11,767 486 4.1% 5,662 68 1.2% 2,353 42 1.8% 2,976 11 0.4%
2000 19,662 2,360 12.0% 4,328 67 1.6% 3,424 211 6.1%
2001 21,604 2,940 13.6% 7,903 377 4.8% 4,333 70 1.6% 3,672 250 6.8%
2002 18,266 2,729 14.9% 8,627 586 6.8% 4,387 102 2.3% 4,473 421 9.4% 1,950 363 18.6%
Sources: For 1980, 1985, and 1990, International Business Research, Million Baht Business Information. For 1995, Business
Research & Data Center Co., Ltd., Business Profile Thailand. For 2000, 2001, and 2002, Thailand’s Advanced Research
Group Co. Ltd, Thailand Company Information.
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and the export of Feather shampoo was initiated at his request. The product soon became
popular in Thailand, exceeding the sales of soap-type shampoos sold by European
competitors.
Kao and Taishin proceeded to establish a JV called “Kao Thailand” in 1964, which was
the main reason for tariff increases.6 The capital ratio of Kao Thailand between Kao and
Taishin was 87:13, a ratio that also affected the structure of the board of directors. To
emphasize the independence of the local partner, Taishin was selected to appoint Kao
Thailand’s first president. The agreement was that Kao was responsible for transferring
production technology and Taishin would mainly contribute to sales.
The JV’s factory began operations in 1965 in Phra Pradaeng in the Samut Prakan
province. At this facility, Kao introduced an integrated process of local production that
comprised every step from the sulfation of raw materials to packaging. As a result, Kao
transferred advanced technology to the Phra Pradaeng factory in 1971.
Kao Thailand had two main distribution channels in the 1960s. The first was the
wholesaler route, and the second used agents through Taishin. Products were distributed to
rural areas through seven sub-agencies, each of which was closely related to Taishin. At the
time, a Taishin promotional campaign involving the distribution of sample goods and picture
cards had a notable effect (the television had not yet become the main advertising medium).
In addition, Kao Thailand sold products to small retailers directly using “cash sales vans,”
which differed from the method Kao implemented in Japan. With this method, salespeople
navigated their territories in vans loaded with goods and sold them to retail stores for cash.
This system had two advantages: it eliminated the need to collect payments and served as a
means of advertising.
Change of Relationship
Taishin was an important partner at the beginning of the business venture in Thailand,
but Kao soon became dissatisfied with it. For example, Kao believed that the weakness of
sales to rural areas was a significant problem. In 1972, Kao required Taishin to cut the
number of account wholesalers from 2,000 stores to 344 and replace the sales areas of the
remaining 1,656 stores with direct contact from Kao Thailand. Instead of accepting this,
Taishin sold Kao products through its own sales channel using the Tancho (now Mandom)
brand, which was one of Taishin’s primary suppliers (Kao Corporation, 1986, pp. 58-59).
The second change came in 1975, when Kao Thailand separated its sales and marketing
6 Bangkok Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Shinsyutsu Kigyo Shokai Sono 27 Kao Industrial
(Thailand) Co., Ltd. (Introduction of Companies Entering in Thailand, No. 27, Kao Industrial
(Thailand) Co., Ltd. Shoho (Monthly Report, No. 125, 1971, p. 53).
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departments from their production unit to establish Kao Commercial (Thailand) Co., Ltd.7
Taishin owned 52.8 percent of this company.
Despite these changes, Kao had difficulty surviving in the Thai market in the 1970s,
mainly because the powder-type Feather shampoo lost its position during the boom in liquid
shampoos. Moreover, Colgate’s Fab and Lever Brothers’ Breeze had achieved 25 and 30
percent market shares in the Thai detergent market by 1973, but Kao’s Asachan could not
maintain a fixed position (Kao Corporation, 1986, p. 67). Thus, instead of relying on
shampoo and laundry detergent, Kao diversified its product line to include sanitary goods,
bleach, liquid detergent for tableware, and mosquito coils.8 Initially, sanitary goods were the
most successful of these products because the number of young consumers steadily
increased in Thailand. Kao’s bleach product was also successful because wearing white
clothing is popular in Thailand. However, Kao had difficulty realizing a full product line in
the country.
Development toward the Wholly Owned Subsidiary
Despite the advantages of the cash sales van, a precise list of retail stores that sold Kao
Thailand’s products could not be created under this system, and transaction prices varied by
area. To cope with these problems, Kao Thailand adopted a new sales system in the early
1990s and established 18 sales offices that exclusively sold Kao products throughout
Thailand. These sales offices formerly belonged to Kao commercial, the JV established by
Taishin and Kao. The products were sold primarily from sales offices directly to large chain
stores, and some were sold through traditional wholesalers. As part of this new approach,
Kao introduced a comprehensive sales manual called the Call Book that was significantly
influenced by Procter & Gamble and used it to train Thai salespersons and educate local
staff on how to negotiate with retail stores (Kao Corporation, 1986, p. 83). It is noteworthy
that Kao achieved this direct sales channel solely through Kao’s authority. Thus, the
influence of Taishin disappeared during this period.
Relying on this new distribution channel, Kao introduced new, advanced products into
the Thai market such as the concentrated (high-density) detergent Attack, which was known
in Japan as an epoch-making hit product.9 It was truly an innovative product in the Thai
market, with a sufficient advertising budget comparable to that for Lever Brothers’ Breeze
7 Kao Commercial (Thailand) was established because of the 1972 Alien Business Law, which forbade
foreign investments in wholesalers except when the local partner(s) held majority stakes.
8 Bangkok Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Chemical Industry Section (ed.). Tai no Kagaku Sangyo no
gaiyo (Profile of the Thai Chemical Industry), Bangkok, 1995 (in Japanese).
9 Kagaku Kogyo Nippo (Jan. 10, 1990).
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Excel.10 Attack substantially impacted the Thai market, but, unfortunately for Kao, it caused
Lever Brothers to respond. Lever Brothers introduced Omo in 1992 as a whiteness brand as
well as two new Breeze products, Breeze Excel and Breeze Color. Nevertheless, there was
still a deep-rooted need for conventional detergent. Even after the appearance of
concentrated detergent, about 60 percent of customers continued to use conventional
detergent because it was cheaper and they were reluctant to abandon the custom of
handwashing. While other competitors had strong brands in the lower sector, Kao lacked a
fixed position in this price band. This situation prompted the development of Attack Easy, a
new type of conventional detergent that was strongly supported by Kao Japan’s research
center (Ihara, 2014).
The same situation prevailed in the hair care business. Sifone and Lavenus became
popular in the early 1990s and late 1990s, but they could not compete with the Lever
Brothers because their advertising investment was limited. For example, in the latter half of
the 1990s, Kao’s advertising budget for shampoo was only one-fifth of that of the Lever
Brothers.11
By then, however, Taishin’s role in Kao Thailand had already weakened. Kao realized
that there were no longer any growth advantages to maintaining the partnership with
Taishin. As a result, in 1998, Kao Thailand became Kao’s wholly owned subsidiary. Kao
then made a large investment in IT infrastructure at the beginning of the 2000s and built a
new factory in 2005. Despite these reforms, Kao’s situation does not seem to have
drastically changed. After the Asian crisis, Kao overhauled its product lineup and decided to
focus on core brands for concentrated investments (Kao Corporation, 2012). In particular,
Kao introduced a new conventional-type detergent, Attack Easy, to meet the strong demand
for conventional detergent (Kao Corporation, 2012, pp. 787-788). Attack Easy recovered a
large market share, and Attack regained its position as one of Thai’s leading clothing
detergent brands. Unfortunately, the company still faced difficulties developing a core hair
care brand.
Advanced Technology in the Subsidiary
As mentioned, Japanese knowledge was transferred to the subsidiary, Kao Thailand;
however, its influence on the partner was limited. As discussed, Taishin reduced its sales of
Kao products in the 1970s and finally abolished the relationship with Kao in 1998. Taishin
did not expand its business. It continued to sell Mandom products in the 1970s, although
Mandom believed that Taishin was conservative and did not adapt to the changing
10 Unilever Magazine (1995, Third issue, No. 7, pp. 13-14).
11 Than Settakij (March 5-7, 1998; in Thai).
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environment of Thai retailing and thus eventually stopped dealing with them.
Taishin’s interest in Kao Thailand was limited to marketing, and it paid little attention to
technology and production because it did not want to grow beyond its role as a merchant.
Thus, the technology transfer process in this JV was similar to that of normal internal
technology transfers in MNEs. There is evidence of Kao’s eagerness to transfer advanced
technology to its Thai subsidiary. One example is the climbing film reactor, which was
introduced in the Thai factory in 1971. It was an original production technology developed
in Kao’s Wakayama plant, Kao Japan’s production base, to make the sulfation process more
safe and economical (Ihara, 2009, pp. 77-78). By the beginning of the 1990s, Kao
Thailand’s plant was no longer labor-intensive. Advanced automatic packaging machines
were introduced to package shampoo bottles and sanitary products, which helped reduce the
need for human labor and realize high quality standards, as in the Wakayama plant (Ihara,
2008, pp. 38-61).
This study has already described Kao’s vertical marketing system, which had a sales
company at its core. The system was supported by a wide range of product lines and strict
inventory management, accompanied by in-house knowledge of sales, small retailer support,
inventory management, and advertising in Japan. This study finds that Kao tried to replicate
such a system in Thailand but faced barriers. Kao was a highly innovative company and was
perceived as a threat by competitors, although its operations were costly and sometimes did
not reflect the needs of local customers.
Case of Lion-Sahapat
Establishment of Lion Corporation (Thailand)
Founded in 1891 as a trading company specializing in soap and match materials, Lion
has since developed as a manufacturer of toothpaste, toothbrushes, laundry soap, detergent,
and kitchen detergent. Lion has been smaller than Kao in terms of size and sales, and only
its toothpaste has remained a market leader in Japan. However, the major difference between
Lion and Kao is their sales channel policies. While Kao established a sales company as its
exclusive wholesaler, Lion widely traded with independent wholesalers and organized a
group of independent retailers. These channel policies are backed up by its managerial
notions of “coexistence” and “co-prosperity” with wholesalers and retailers. In addition, Kao
is not part of a zaibatsu (large Japanese business conglomerate), while Lion belongs to one
of Japan’s major zaibatsus, the Mizuho group (formerly known as “San-kin kai”). Lion’s
first overseas venture was Lion Dentifrice (Thailand) Co. Ltd.12 Lion’s overseas growth
12 Lion Corporation, https://lion.co.jp, accessed on July 19, 2014.
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strategy was to find capable local partners to work with. Lion was considered the production
and marketing technology supplier and management coach, while the local partners’ core
competence was their strong pursuit of collaborative growth. The key principles were
“together we grow,” mutual agreement, equal capital, and equal rights in management, both
in sales and production.
Lion’s overseas business has been moderate compared to that of Kao. Its share of
overseas sales is 15 percent, and its regional expansion is virtually limited to Asia; Thailand
accounts for more than 50 percent of its overseas sales.13 This limited development of
overseas business reflects the organization’s simple overseas divisional structure, in which
the overseas division is separate from the product divisions and coordinates all the
operations of Lion’s subsidiaries. Lion implemented a localization policy in which the JV
approach is a standard style of overseas business, whereby the local operations authority is
assigned to the local partner.
The Lion Corporation (Thailand; hereafter “Thai Lion”) was a JV between Lion and
Sahapat that formed after they had worked together for a decade as the exporter and
importer of consumer products to Thailand. The mutual decision to form a JV was also a
response to the Sarit administration’s domestic production promotion policy. Unlike most of
the factories owned by the Japanese or Japanese-Thai JVs built around Prapadaeng, which is
far from the capital, the Thai Lion factory was located on the Rama III road close to the
distribution center, Sampeng, in Bangkok.14 Thai Lion was the production unit, and Sahapat
was the selling and marketing unit. This form of organization, in which the selling unit is
separate from the production unit, is typical of Japanese companies. Hence, the roles of Thai
Lion and Sahapat were clearly delineated from the outset. By this arrangement, in addition
to profit sharing by the Thai Lion operation, Lion earned royalty fees from Thai Lion’s total
sales of the technology it transferred, while Sahapat earned revenue from the price
difference between the cost of goods sold by Thai Lion and the selling price. Lion held
stakes in Thai Lion, the manufacturing unit, but not in Sahapat, the distributor unit.
Nevertheless, they worked with each other closely as if they were the same company. Lion
even lowered its royalty fees to near zero at the beginning of the JV to ensure its survival
(Naotsuna Taira 2014, personal communication). This demonstrates the mutual trust and
close relationship between Lion and Sahapat before and after the decision to co-invest and
shows how the new venture was managed and developed.
Founded as an importer and wholesaler of consumer goods, Sahapat had first-mover
13 Lion Corporation, Annual Report (Tokyo; 2012).
14 Thiam’s wife, Prapin, was a land banker and bought a number of land plots, which were later used to
set up Sahapat’s factories and JVs.
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advantages in social capital and distribution networks. Thiam, Sahapat’s founder, developed
a strong relationship with Chin Sophonpanich, the founder of Bangkok Bank, the largest
commercial bank at the time. He also built a good relationship with Mitsui Bussan and
Mitsubishi Trading. The former introduced the Lion Corporation to Sahapat, while the latter
helped them with the funding needed to establish the Thai-Lion Plant. Sahapat also built a
good credit standing among Chinese and Japanese merchants and had acquired experience in
international sourcing since World War II, when goods from the West could not be supplied
regularly. The company also purchased offices in Hong Kong and Osaka, Japan. Thus,
Sahapat was already larger in its size and social network than Kao’s partner Taishin.
Lion’s business expansion strategy was based on full-scale localization in terms of both
management and product development. The idea was to nurture the new venture such that it
could function independently with minimal control from Lion. This was a risky decision.
Performance would depend on how well the transfer was conducted and knowledge was
absorbed. However, Sahapat was also prepared to transform itself from a mere distributor to
a manufacturer. This allowed Sahapat to differ from most distributors at the time because
they showed little interest in moving forward along the upstream of the value chain.
Consequently, when Lion encouraged Thai Lion to set up its own research and development
(R&D) unit to support local market preference adaptation, the Thai management responded
proactively. Thai Lion started recruiting local scientists and engineers from prestigious
universities to their R&D unit and sent them to Lion Corporation, Tokyo, to receive
training. From the outset, Lion coached Sahapat on manufacturing, from the planning stage
to the quality control and consumer research stages. Lion and Sahapat worked together
under an ethos of mutual agreement in managing Thai Lion, regardless of the registered
capital share. Although Kao’s scale was larger than Lion’s (in contrast to the Kao-Taishin
JV), Sahapat appeared to hold a position as a local partner with Lion that was stronger than
the position Taishin held with Kao.
Strengthening the Relationship with the Open Thai Market
Lion and Sahapat shared a mutual learning relationship during the internationalization
process of Lion’s entry into the Thai market. While Kao struggled to build a distribution
channel, Thai Lion found it difficult to develop effective products. Further, with production
heavily localized from the outset, Thai Lion faced difficulties establishing a suitable
environment for technology transfer in terms of human resource development, manufacturing
mindset, and organizational development. This section describes the failures and successes
of Thai Lion in introducing new products to Thai consumers.
Powder shampoo was the key product that established the Lion brand image in Thailand
in the 1950s. However, when the market preference turned to liquid shampoo, Thai Lion
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could not find a good match for its rival products. The JV also struggled to introduce
detergents. When Lion’s Top detergent was launched, it had to be immediately withdrawn
because of humidity ― the powder clotted when the consumer opened the box ― marring
Thai Lion’s reputation. It took three years to successfully re-launch the Top brand after a
thorough market survey and repeated product testing (Lion [Thailand], 2006, pp. 60-64).
Years passed before the company truly understood local preferences regarding, for example,
package color and preferred scent. The venture’s success came in 1975, when it developed a
local brand detergent, Pao Bun Jin, later abbreviated to “Pao” for copyright reasons.
Supported by thorough consumer research, stringent quality control, and appropriate pricing
strategies, the new brand gained a market share as high as 10 percent upon its launch. This
figure increased to 30 percent in the 2000s, reflecting the continuing popularity of the
brand.15
Brand name selection, communication strategy, pricing policy, and product quality were
the key factors that made Pao Bun Jin one of the three biggest detergents in the market. At
a time when foreign brand names were standard, Pao Bun Jin, a name borrowed from a
character in a Taiwanese TV drama, was not regarded as modern. However, the name
referred to a judge who went against all odds to conduct his job properly, which strongly
connected with consumer emotions at the time, thus becoming a marketing magnet and
motivating use of the new brand. In addition, Pao was the first of its kind to achieve the
industrial standard from the Ministry of Industry of Thailand (Boonyarit Mahamontri, 2014,
personal communication). The product’s overnight success occurred partly because it
matched the economic situation after the 1973 oil shocks. Furthermore, because Thai Lion
was a latecomer that had failed in a prior attempt to set up a position in the detergent
market, competitors paid little attention to the new brand and thus did not preempt it
(Viriyapunditkul, 2008, pp. 87-91).
Thai Lion was less successful with toothpaste and soap in the 1950s. The difficulties in
marketing toothpaste can be attributed to the strong position of first-movers such as Colgate
and the loss of trust and brand image created by the earlier humidity problem. Lion soap
had been imported and was later manufactured by Sahapat as a wholly owned venture;
however, it was unsuccessful owing to the lack of technology and thorough market survey
analysis (Viriyapunditkul, 2008, pp. 101-104). This shows that Sahapat needed technological
support from its partner, Lion. Nevertheless, Sahapat started producing toothpaste and soap
once again, focusing on niche and highly segmented markets in the 1990s. Its product lines
gained breadth and width only in later, in the 2000s.
15 Detergents for whitening, softening, machine wash, and dark color clothes are some of the incremental
product line extensions currently implemented by this brand.
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Kao and its Western counterparts tended to build their own distribution networks,16 but
Thai Lion used existing wholesalers and retailers to distribute and promote its products. This
channel strategy enabled Lion and Sahapat to mobilize their products and marketing
information to obtain market information in a timely and fluid manner. Unlike Kao and the
Western brands, Sahapat opted to develop untapped markets in rural areas. Affordable prices
and heavy sales promotion were the key weapons used to penetrate these markets. Further,
an efficient distribution system was vital to ensure a steady supply to meet increased sales
after promotions.
In the 1970s, Sahapat implemented a distribution center as an operational key to modern
large-scale retailing, now a common concept. Sahapat appointed wholesalers that could use
their warehouses as distribution centers. Applying the same theory, Sahapat learned from
Lion under the principle of “together we grow” and paid significant attention to dealer
visiting programs, whereby Sahapat executives, especially Thiam, visited each dealer to
learn about the market and advise them on company products and marketing (Boonyarit
Mahamontri, 2014, personal communication). The company would then decide on an
appropriate sales promotion that responded to local needs. In this way, localization was
further strengthened through channel strategies. Sahapat further strengthened its core
distribution competencies by introducing an online order system and an integrated IT system
for inventory management. The latter was eventually developed into a vendor-managed
inventory system (VMIS) in the 1980s, the first of its kind. In addition, Thai Lion installed
a warehouse automation system to upgrade product quality assurance and inventory
management efficiency (Viriyapunditkul, 2008, pp. 264-266). Sahapat’s disadvantages lay in
the scale of the capital required and its lack of experience in modern advertising. A
mechanism for stimulating consumer decision making was needed to mitigate the
disadvantage of being smaller and a market latecomer. In addition to radio advertising,
which was a powerful means of communication in the 1950s, Sahapat put on events in
cinemas to attract audiences to live brand demonstrations after the shows (Naotsuna Taira,
2014, personal communication). Sahapat’s live demonstrations and radio advertisements are
said to be legendary even today (Wilaithong, 2006).
Apart from these brand awareness-boosting activities, an intense campaign involving give
-away and tie-in goods was also used to attract consumers. For example, detergents were
tied in with washing bowls and soaps with water buckets, two of the sales promotion
techniques used by consumer product manufacturers at the time. The sales promotion war
16 The Lever Brothers used to make direct calls to retailers. After the 1990s, this function was performed
nationwide by 40 concessionaires, including five in Bangkok, each of whom had its own fleet of vans
covering each part of the country (Unilever Magazine, 1995, 3 No. 97, pp. 15-16). See also Endo
(2013).
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continued to the point where tied-in goods accounted for 80 percent of the space in
distribution trucks, leaving only 20 percent for the main sales products.
Transferred Technology
As mentioned, Lion’s expansion strategy was to utilize the local partner’s core
competence by encouraging knowledge transfers and learning in every dimension. Thiam
was known to be a particularly keen learner, making Sahapata a perfect match for a JV
partner, whereby the technology owner transferred knowledge and the local partner was
eager to absorb and develop it even further as a continuous development practice in the
company.
Sahapat learned from its partner at the operational, organizational, and strategic levels;17
however, it was at the operational level that Lion directly transferred knowledge and
technology to Thai Lion. This study focuses on knowledge transfers in two key areas:
production and marketing. Regarding production, Thai Lion needed to learn the whole
process, from forecasting, planning, and quality control to human resource development. In
the marketing area, although Sahapat was keen on distribution and sales promotion, it
learned about the systematic method of conducting customer insight surveys. Thiam
periodically conducted market surveys, but these mostly comprised distributors’ insights,
such as, sales promotion items that worked in specific geographical areas. Customer insight
surveys were a new branch of knowledge for Sahapat (Boonyarit Mahamontri, 2014,
personal communication).
It is also worth examining how production and management technologies were
transferred to and absorbed by Thai Lion. Managing a plant requires different types of
knowledge, mindsets, and attitudes toward work and the workplace. If machines are to run
efficiently, they need a steady supply of materials. This requires an accurate forecast of the
amount of product to be produced or marketed. It also requires a positive attitude toward
issues such as product quality, waste management, plant cleanliness, and accident prevention
to lower the cost of production by increasing the efficiency rate.
Such knowledge seemed to be new to Sahapat employees. In a memo circulated to
17 At the organizational level, Sahapat learned how to organize a growing business to preempt the
problem of overloaded information flows. This included the application of formal structures or modern
management and the new philosophy regarding succession plans. At the strategic level, Sahapat learned
the importance of linking downstream activities to upstream ones and envisioned the company as a
business group. Thus, it was well-known for using healthy competition to boost strategic business units.
In addition, the company acted earlier than its Chinese merchant colleagues in establishing an industrial
park to obtain economies of scope and scale and in acquiring capital through the stock market so that it
could transition from a sole proprietorship to a public company, separating ownership and management
to match the larger scale of its business empire.
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management and employees in 1974, Thiam mentioned quality control (QC) as Sahapat’s
revolutionary step (Chokwatana, 1991b); this was the turning point when it changed from
distributor to producer. In the seller’s market post-World War II, the key mission was
sourcing; the notion was that any product could be sold because consumers needed
products. Selling-based marketing, where the sales staff was concerned only with increasing
sales, could still work (Booyasit Choakwatana, 2014, personal communication). However, in
a more competitive market, where there were at least three stronger competitors from
Europe, America, and Japan, consumer-based marketing was the only way to maintain a
competitive position in the market.
Consequently, the production unit undertook QC activities, and the marketing unit began
conducting customer insight surveys. Such new activities needed a new mindset that used
statistics rather than subjective judgment drawn from experience alone to achieve the goal of
upgrading product quality. The small QC group was developed into a company-wide
process. Japanese companies introduced QC in the 1960s and diffused it until the 1980s.
Sahapat adopted QC in Thailand as early as 1974, thus allowing the company to claim
being the forerunner of QC practices (Lion [Thailand], 2006, pp. 74-77). Its QC circle also
changed the mindset of local staff from a hierarchical one to one involving greater initiative,
using lessons learned from improved performance.
Despite the product quality mindset, a gap in the technological training of local staff still
existed. As a result, Lion urged Sahapat to send its staff to Japan for training in production
techniques and producer mindsets. Three staff members were therefore sent for training in
Tokyo before Thai Lion began operating (Lion [Thailand], 2006, pp. 52-56). Such open-
mindedness from Sahapat was unusual because it was not an accepted business practice
among Thai merchants to send young staff to Japan. In fact, teaching staff was viewed as a
means of increasing future competition.
Lion also selected the most talented among the technical staff to educate local employees
at the Thai Lion Plant (Naotsuna Taira, 2014, personal communication). Thai staff called the
Japanese staff sensei (“teacher”) as a mark of respect to those who showed a serious
intention to transfer technology at the highest level to the JV (Boonyarit Mahamontri, 2014,
personal communication).
Further Development of Organizational Capability
Although most of the outstanding product innovation at Thai Lion was seen in the 2000s,
outstanding capability developments occurred in at least two areas before this period. The
first was the application of the VMIS, and the second was the change in organizational
structure that enabled Thai Lion to be more consumer-oriented. The former development
resulted from attempts to manage data from marketing to production in a timely manner.
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The latter resulted from the decision to move the marketing department, marketing
management department, and IT department from Sahapat to Thai Lion. Consequently, Thai
Lion was not only a production unit that focused on Lion’s technology from Japan but also
integrated local preferences into the new product development process. This organizational
structure reflected a unique product development process, the Sashimi model, whereby
engineering, marketing, sales, and other related departments expressed their views about the
product development process (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1986). By so doing, Thai Lion
continued to introduce new products to the market.
Capability developments at Thai Lion have generally resulted from continuous learning
from both Lion and Sahapat. However, Boonyarit, president of Thai Lion, revealed that the
company did not have to rely on Lion or Japanese technology alone. For example, they
could order production machinery from Europe if the performance and cost effectiveness
was better (Boonyarit Mahamontri, 2014, personal communication). Thus, Thai Lion learned
from different sources and combined the knowledge into an approach that suited its
operation. In other words, Thai Lion positioned itself as an independent unit in terms of
competence development. Further, because Lion limited the number of Japanese expatriates
to two, a production chief engineer and a management liaison, local staff had opportunities
to learn by doing as well as by trial and error, rather than merely imitating (Kazuo
Obayashi, 2014, personal communication).
It is worth noting that, while Kao Thailand developed its organizational capability in
marketing throughout its two decades of learning about the local Thai market, organizational
development in marketing was already available in Sahapat, while production capability was
upgraded in Thai Lion. Here as well, the root cause of this difference lies in the different
modes of entry used by the two Japanese manufacturers.
Concluding Remarks
This work analyzes two Japanese-Thai JVs founded during similar periods in Thailand
using a similar JV entry mode. However, they evolved differently and have taken different
paths over the past three decades: while one changed into a wholly owned subsidiary that
moved on from the JV and thoroughly understands the local market, the other remains a JV
that enables the local partner to be a stronger organization and a fundamental part of the
business group, which in turn strengthens the JV. During the period of economic progress of
the 1950s and 1960s, local partners were crucial because they served as barriers to foreign
partners by understanding the local market well enough to satisfy consumers who were open
to new products. However, the difference between the two JVs becomes more prominent
after the 1970s. From the 1970s to the 1990s, Kao began introducing innovative products,
advanced production technology, effective advertising, and thorough distribution
Motoi IHARA and Patnaree SRISUPHAOLARN52
／関西学院大学ＩＲＢ　Ｎｏ．１９／３　ＩＨＡＲＡ　　　　Ｐ０３５－０５６白／本文　★４ 2019.02.18 11.50.20 Page 52
management. Its centralized organization was also efficient at transferring knowledge from
headquarters to its subsidiary. When the local partner was unable to cope with the increased
burden of learning new organizational and market management methods, the JV was
dissolved into a wholly owned subsidiary. By contrast, Lion followed another path in which
more autonomy was given to the local partner. This opened a new Thai domestic market,
achieved by developing new products that suited consumer preferences. The company also
built its own distribution channel and in-house advertising organization. In light of the
theory of JV, The JV between Lion and Sahapat seems to be a rare case that maintained a
long-term relationship. Sahapat’s long-term perspective and the mutual trust between Lion
and Sahapat were the key success factors.
Our comparative study confirmed the role of JVs as a knowledge transfer vehicle and
offered important insights into the natural assumption underlying the theory of MNEs. First,
knowledge transfer into JVs is not automatic but is a dynamic process that includes both the
possibility of cooperation and conflicts. Second, the less the JV is internalized, the more the
recipient’s ability to learn is critical. For Lion-Sahapat, a typical example of equally owned
JV, the local partner was superior in localization and in combining Japanese knowledge on
organizational management, marketing research techniques, and production with local
managerial resources. For Kao-Thaishin, a typical example of a JV majority-owned by
MNEs, the local partner played a role in localization but was not an active recipient of
advanced technology or management skills. Third, the degree of internalization was not
critical to economic outcomes. Kao-Thaishin was superior in transferring advanced Japanese
technology and marketing but was weak in fitting them into local conditions. On the other
hand, Lion was superior in fitting Japanese knowledge to local conditions but was slow to
introduce advanced technology and products. As a result, the companies’ economic
outcomes did not differ significantly, at least in Thailand.
However, our scope was limited to two JVs. More theoretical considerations of JVs or
business alliances are needed to contribute further to the theory of MNEs. In addition,
further study on local partners is necessary to explain the overall organizational capability of
local capital. As mentioned, an excellent learner does not rely only on the JV partner but
rather learns from different sources and combines them into the approach that best suits its
operation. To illustrate such an independent organizational capability, more comprehensive
studies on the learning of local enterprises are needed. This work opens the door to such
research.
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